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We consider the asymptotic key rates achieved in the simplest quantum key distribution protocols,
namely the BB84 and the six-state protocols, when non-uniform noise is present in the system. We
first observe that higher qubit error rates do not necessarily imply lower key rates. Secondly, we
consider protocols with advantage distillation and show that it can be advantageous to use the basis
with higher quantum bit error rate for the key generation. We then discuss the relation between
advantage distillation and entanglement distillation protocols. We show that applying advantage
distillation to a string of bits formed by the outcomes of measurements in the basis with higher
quantum bit error rate is closely connected to the two-to-one entanglement distillation protocol
DEJMPS [1]. Finally, we discuss the implications of these results for implementations of quantum
key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2, 3] is one of the
most remarkable examples of the power of quantum me-
chanics. Many classical crypto-systems used for secure
communication nowadays are based on computational as-
sumptions. Computational assumptions make these sys-
tems vulnerable to retroactive attacks in case more pow-
erful quantum computers become available in the future.
In contrast, quantum mechanics allows two parties to
distribute a key achieving information-theoretic security.
This means that security is guaranteed even against an
eavesdropper that has unlimited classical and quantum
resources. Secure communication can then be achieved
if this key is used in a one-time pad scheme [4, 5] (for
a discussion about the assumptions present in a QKD
implementation, see [6]).
Near term quantum technologies suffer from imperfec-
tions. Therefore, even in the absence of an active eaves-
dropper, a QKD implementation will be subjected to a
finite amount of noise. In order to guarantee security,
one is interested in designing protocols that can tolerate
levels of noise compatible with current technology and at
the same time achieve the highest possible key rates.
The simplest proposed QKD protocol, BB84 [2], is
based on the conjugate coding ideas developed by Wies-
ner in [7]. In the BB84, Alice prepares a single qubit
state in one of the eigenstates of the Z-basis, {|0〉 , |1〉},
or one of the eigenstates of the X-basis, {|+〉 , |−〉}.
An extension of the BB84, exploring three conjugate
bases, was proposed in [8] and is called the six-state
protocol. In the six-state protocol, Alice can also pre-
pare the qubit in one of the eigenstates of the Y-basis,{
|+Y 〉 = 1√2 (|0〉+ i |1〉), |−Y 〉 1√2 (|0〉 − i |1〉)
}
. The six-
state protocol was proven to be more robust to noise [8].
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that more parameters
are characterized during the protocol, therefore restrict-
ing the possible actions of a potential eavesdropper.
In this article, we consider the asymptotic key rates
that can be obtained in the BB84 and six-state protocols
as a function of the quantum bit error rates (QBERs).
We first consider instances of these protocols in which
information reconciliation and privacy amplification are
applied directly to the raw keys formed by the outcomes
of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements. Then, we consider
the case when, additionally, a sub-routine that allows Al-
ice and Bob to select more correlated parts of their string,
namely advantage distillation, is applied to the raw keys
before information reconciliation. We discuss observed
counter-intuitive behaviors of the asymptotic key rates
with the QBER. As our main result, we show that in the
presence of asymmetric noise, higher key rates may be
obtained if the basis with higher QBER is used for the
key generation in protocols with advantage distillation.
This can have a direct impact for implementations that
make use of advantage distillation [9]. Finally, we show
that implementing the six-state protocol with advantage
distillation and measurements in the basis with higher
QBER, is closely connected to the two-to-one entangle-
ment distillation protocol DEJMPS [1].
The manuscript is organized as following: in the re-
mainder of this section we detail the general structure of
the QKD protocols under consideration. In Section II,
we first consider the asymptotic key rates of the BB84
and the six-state protocols without advantage distilla-
tion. We then proceed to analyze the effect of advan-
tage distillation and show interesting behaviors of the
key rates as a function of the QBERs. In Section III,
we discuss the relation of QKD and entanglement distil-
lation protocols. Finally, in Section IV, we discuss the
implications of our results to experimental implementa-
tions.
A. Quantum Key Distribution protocols
For an implementation of the BB84 or six-state pro-
tocols, the only required resources are the preparation,
transmission and measurement of single-qubit states.
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2That is, these protocols can be implemented in a
prepare-and-measure set-up without the need of entan-
glement. However, both protocols have an equivalent
entanglement-based implementation [3, 10], in which a
source (that may be in Alice’s lab) produces a state that
is distributed to Alice and Bob (ideally the maximally
entangled state, |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉)). Then, upon
receiving their systems, Alice and Bob perform measure-
ments in randomly chosen bases (having two choices of
basis for the BB84, and three for the six-state protocol).
As long as the measurement devices are well character-
ized and controlled, an entanglement-based implementa-
tion allows one to relax the need for a precise charac-
terization of the state preparation. The entanglement-
based version of the BB84 and six-state protocols played
a key role to formalize their security proofs [11–13]. From
now on, for the purpose of our analyses, we focus on the
entanglement-based version of these protocols. However
we remark that for all our results, there is an equiva-
lent implementation that requires only single-qubit states
preparation.
The BB84 and the six-state protocols can be described
by four main steps:
1. Distribution and measurements: Alice uses
the source to produce a two-qubit state. She keeps
one qubit and sends the other to Bob using a quan-
tum channel. Upon receiving the systems, Alice
and Bob, each randomly chooses a basis and per-
forms the corresponding measurement. They re-
peat this procedure N times. With the outcomes
of their measurements they establish a string of N
bits each.
2. Sifting and parameter estimation: Alice and
Bob communicate the measurement bases and dis-
card the rounds in which different bases were used.
Moreover, they sacrifice m bits in order to esti-
mate their average correlation and decide whether
to abort or proceed with the protocol. If the proto-
col does not abort, the remaining n bits constitute
the raw key.
3. Advantage distillation (optional): The goal is
to classically post-process the raw key, in order to
increase the correlation between Alice and Bob, and
get an advantage over the eavesdropper.
4. Information reconciliation and privacy am-
plification: In this step, Alice and Bob first im-
plement an information reconciliation protocol that
allows Bob to correct his bit-string for errors. Fi-
nally, they apply a privacy amplification protocol
to transform a partially secure key of n bits into a
secure key of l < n bits.
The parameters estimated in Step 2 are determined
by the particular protocol. In an implementation of the
BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob can estimate the values of
the quantum bit error rates (QBERs) in the X and Z
bases, QX and QZ . For the six-state protocol, they will
also have an estimate of the QBER in the Y -basis, QY .
The QBER in the Z(X)-basis, QZ(QX), is the proba-
bility that Alice and Bob get different outcomes when
they both measure their systems in the basis Z(X). The
QBER in the Y -basis is defined in a similar way, however,
since the target state |Φ+〉 exhibits anti-correlation in the
Y -basis, Bob flips his outcomes whenever he chooses to
measure in the Y -basis.
In the originally proposed BB84 and six-state proto-
cols, all the bases were chosen with equal probability
among the set of bases specified by the protocols. How-
ever, as shown in [14], the efficiency of these protocols
can be increased, without compromising security, if one
of the bases is chosen with a higher probability. Then, in
the asymptotic limit, the preferred basis is used almost all
the time. The remaining bases are used only occasionally
in order to test for the eavesdropper. This significantly
increases the key rates, as only a small fraction of the
rounds are discarded in the sifting process. In these pro-
tocols, the raw key is usually created from the rounds in
which the preferred basis is used. The remaining rounds,
in which other bases were chosen, are used for parameter
estimation. For this reason, we denote the basis chosen
with higher probability as the key generation basis.
Advantage distillation, in Step 3, is an optional step.
It consists of Alice and Bob using two-way classical com-
munication to select parts of the raw key that exhibit
stronger correlation. This method was introduced in the
context of classical protocols [15] and was proven to be
useful for quantum protocols as well [16, 17]. Usually, ad-
vantage distillation leads to significant drops in the key
rate for the low noise regime, but it can considerably in-
crease the noise tolerance of a protocol. For example,
a BB84 implementation subjected to depolarizing noise
(in which QX = QZ) without advantage distillation can
tolerate up to 11% of QBER. If some advantage distil-
lation is performed, the noise tolerance can be increased
to 20% QBER [16]. Advantage distillation protocols that
have better performance in the low noise regime were also
proposed [18].
Information reconciliation, in Step 4, aims at correct-
ing Bob’s string in order to make it equal to Alice’s
string. Information reconciliation can be implemented
using only one-way communication from Alice to Bob.
Interactive protocols [19], which are efficient to imple-
ment, are broadly used in QKD implementations [20].
These protocols require two-way communication, how-
ever, they should not be confused with advantage dis-
tillation performed in Step 3. In advantage distillation,
two-way communication is essential and, moreover, both
Alice’s and Bob’s strings are modified during the proto-
col.
3II. RESULTS
A. Key rates for protocols without advantage
distillation
We first consider the BB84 and the six-state protocols
when Alice and Bob skip Step 3. After measuring their
quantum systems, Alice and Bob proceed to perform in-
formation reconciliation and privacy amplification. In-
formation reconciliation protocols based on two-universal
hashing functions leak the minimum amount of informa-
tion necessary to correct for errors in Bob’s string [19].
In [21], it was proven that the minimum leakage of a
one-way information reconciliation protocol is given by
nH(A|B) + O(√n), where H(A|B) is the entropy of
Alice’s output conditioned on Bob’s output, defined as
H(A|B) = −∑a,b p(A = a,B = b) log p(A = a|B = b)
with p(A = a,B = b) being the probability that Alice and
Bob obtain outcomes a and b, respectively, for the mea-
surement in consideration, p(A = a|B = b) = p(A=a,B=b)p(B=b)
is the conditional probability, and the logarithms are
taken in basis 2.
In order to analyze the key rate of the BB84 and the
six-state protocol we can assume w.l.o.g. that the state
distributed by the source is a Bell-diagonal state [13]:
ρ = λ00Φ00 + λ01Φ01 + λ10Φ10 + λ11Φ11, (1)
where Φij = |Φij〉〈Φij | and |Φij〉 = XiZj ⊗ I |Φ+〉.
Restricting the analysis to Bell-diagonal states is suffi-
ciently general because for all states ρ′ such that λij =
〈Φij | ρ′ |Φij〉, the corresponding Bell-diagonal state ex-
hibits the same QBERs as the original state and leads to
the lowest key rate [13].
For the security analysis, it is also assumed that
the measurements are perfect and all the noise can be
mapped into the distributed state. In this case, the Bell
coefficients {λij} relate to the QBERs QX , QY , and QZ
by the following:
λ00 = 1− (QX +QY +QZ)
2
,
λ01 =
QX +QY −QZ
2
,
λ10 =
−QX +QY +QZ
2
,
λ11 =
QX −QY +QZ
2
.
(2)
Note that a Bell-diagonal state is completely character-
ized by the three QBERs (QX , QY , QZ).
The key rates for the BB84 and the six-state protocols
can be determined as a function of the coefficients of the
estimated Bell-diagonal state, and therefore as a function
of the QBERs. In a real implementation, in which a
finite number of rounds is considered, statistical effects
play a role in the value of the key rate. However, for a
sufficiently large number of rounds, the key rate of the
six-state protocol, with Z being the key generation basis,
approaches the asymptotic value given by [12, 13, 22]:
R6state = 1−H({λij}), (3)
where H({λij}) =
∑
ij −λij log λij , and the logarithms
are taken in basis 2.
For BB84, since information about QY is not available,
the key rate is given by the minimum over all possible
values of QY . This results in [11, 13, 22]:
RBB84 = 1− h(QX)− h(QZ), (4)
where h(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the binary
entropy.
If one of the other available bases is used for the key
generation, the corresponding key rate can be obtained
by simply permuting the QBERs in expressions (3) and
(4). Note that choosing the basis for key generation im-
plies a choice of protocol. Once the key generation basis
is fixed, Alice and Bob can run the protocol using this
basis for almost all the rounds. The key rate now de-
pends on the information available to the eavesdropper
when the estimated state, given in eq. (1), is measured
in the chosen key generation basis. A measurement in
the X-basis, or the Y -basis, performed on the estimated
state, eq. (1), can be seen as a Z-basis measurement per-
formed on a rotated state. The corresponding rotated
state for when the X-basis, or the Y -basis, is used for
the key generation measurement relates to eq. (1) by a
permutation of the coefficients {λij}. Eqs. (3) and (4) are
invariant under permutation of the QBERs. Therefore,
the resulting key rate for protocols that use information
reconciliation with minimum leakage is the same regard-
less of which of the available bases, {X,Z} for BB84 and
{X,Y, Z} for six-state, is chosen for the key generation
rounds. This is stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. In an implementation of the BB84 or
the six-state protocol in which an information reconcilia-
tion protocol with minimum leakage is used, the asymp-
totic key rate does not depend on which of the available
bases is chosen as the key generation basis.
Remark: It is important to remark that Proposition 1
takes into account that information reconciliation is per-
formed using a protocol with minimum leakage. The
minimum leakage is asymptotically given by h(QM ),
where M is the basis used for the key generation rounds,
M ∈ {X,Z} for BB84 and M ∈ {X,Y, Z} for the
six-state protocol. Information reconciliation protocols
with minimum leakage cannot be implemented in prac-
tice, and protocols that have higher leakage are used
instead. There exist efficient information reconciliation
protocols with asymptotic leakage given by f · h(QM ),
where f ≤ 1.2 [23–25]. The use of a sub-optimal infor-
mation reconciliation protocol creates an asymmetry of
the QBERs in the key rate, and in this case, in order to
maximize the key, it is advantageous to choose the basis
4with the lowest QBER for the key generation rounds.
Now we state an interesting fact regarding the key rates
of the six-states protocol when an information reconcili-
ation protocol with minimum leakage is used.
Observation 1. For fixed values of QX and QZ , the key
rate is not a monotonically decreasing function of QY .
Proof. If we fix the values of QX and QZ , in order to en-
sure positivity of the corresponding Bell-diagonal state,
the possible values of QY are in the range
|QX −QZ | ≤ QY ≤ QX +QZ . (5)
Additionally, we require that QX + QY + QZ < 1 in
order to have an entangled state. One can see this by
inspecting eq. (2).
Now, evaluating the derivative of the key rate, eq. (3),
with respect to QY , we conclude that the minimum oc-
curs for
Q∗Y = QX +QZ − 2QXQZ , (6)
which can be strictly smaller than the maximum attain-
able value for QY .
Observation 1 is illustrated in Figure 1 for the family
of Bell-diagonal states (QX = 0.1, QY , QZ = 0.1).
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Figure 1: Asymptotic key rate of the six-state proto-
col with minimum leakage information reconciliation as
a function of the QBER in the Y -basis, QY , for the family
of Bell-diagonal states with QX = QZ = 0.1.
Note that the minimum of the curve in Figure 1 gives
the key rate for the BB84 protocol when QX = QZ = 0.1.
Observation 1 together with the continuity of the key
rate for the six-state protocol implies the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 1. There exist a state ρ(1) with QBERs
(Q
(1)
X , Q
(1)
Y , Q
(1)
Z ) and a state ρ
(2) with QBERs
(Q
(2)
X , Q
(2)
Y , Q
(2)
Z ) such that
Q
(1)
X > Q
(2)
X , Q
(1)
Y > Q
(2)
Y , Q
(1)
Z > Q
(2)
Z
and
R6state(ρ
(1)) > R6state(ρ
(2)).
As an example of Corollary 1, take ρ(1) to be the state
with QBERs Q(1)X = Q
(1)
Z = 10% and Q
(1)
Y = 20%, and
ρ(2) to be the state with Q(2)X = Q
(2)
Z = 9.8% and Q
(2)
Y =
18%. It holds that R6state(ρ(1)) > R6state(ρ(2)).
We now investigate the behavior of the singlet fidelity
and the entanglement of formation [26] for the family of
states considered in Figure 1.
For an entangled Bell-diagonal state ρ, eq. (1), with
λ00 >
1
2 , the entanglement of formation [26], EoF , is
given by
EoF (ρ) = h
(
1
2
+
√
λ00(1− λ00)
)
, (7)
and the singlet fidelity F is
F (ρ) = λ00. (8)
Figure 2 illustrates that both quantities are monoton-
ically decreasing functions of QY . This supports the in-
tuition that a state with higher QBER is less close to the
ideal state. However, as stated in Observation 1 - see also
Figure 1, this monotonic behavior is not always observed
in the key rates of the six-state protocol.
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Figure 2: Singlet fidelity (a) and entanglement of forma-
tion (b) for the family of Bell-diagonal state specified by
QBERs (0.1, QY , 0.1). Both quantities decrease mono-
tonically as QY increases, in the range of possible values
of QY , 0 ≤ QY ≤ 0.2.
B. Key rates for protocols with advantage
distillation
We now consider the BB84 and the six-state protocols
when advantage distillation is employed in Step 3. In
particular, we consider the following advantage distilla-
tion protocol [13, 17, 27]:
5Protocol I: Advantage Distillation
Let {a1, . . . , an} and {b1, . . . , bn} be strings of bits held
by Alice and Bob, respectively.
1: Alice and Bob divide their strings in blocks of two con-
secutive bits.
2: for each block j of size 2 do
3: Alice chooses a random bit r ∈ {0, 1} and publicly
communicates (cj1 , cj2) := (aj1 ⊕ r, aj2 ⊕ r) to Bob.
4: Bob checks whether (bj1 ⊕ cj1 , bj2 ⊕ cj2) ∈
{
~0,~1
}
. If
that is the case he accepts, acc = 1, else he sets acc = 0.
5: Bob communicates acc to Alice.
6: If acc = 1 Alice keeps aj1 and Bob keeps bj1 for their
raw key. Else they discard the two bits of the block.
7: end for
The key rates for BB84 and six-state protocol with
advantage distillation, Protocol I, were derived in [13, 17].
For the six-state protocol, the key rate is given by
RAD6state =
1
2
pADsucc(1−H({λ˜ij})), (9)
where pADsucc is the probability that Protocol I succeeds, i.e
that Alice and Bob do not discard a block. This occurs if
either the two bits of Alice and Bob are equal or if both
bits in the block are flipped. Note that steps 3 and 4 of
Protocol I check whether the pair of bits of Alice and the
pair of bits of Bob have the same parity. If the raw key
is generated by measurements in the Z-basis, then
pADsucc = (λ00 + λ01)
2 + (λ10 + λ11)
2 (10)
= Q2Z + (1−QZ)2.
And the coefficients
{
λ˜ij
}
are given by
λ˜00 =
(λ00 + λ01)
2 + (λ00 − λ01)2
2pADsucc
,
λ˜01 =
(λ00 + λ01)
2 − (λ00 − λ01)2
2pADsucc
,
λ˜10 =
(λ10 + λ11)
2 + (λ10 − λ11)2
2pADsucc
,
λ˜11 =
(λ10 + λ11)
2 − (λ10 − λ11)2
2pADsucc
.
(11)
where {λij} relate to the QBERs by eq. (2).
In [13, 17] it was shown that applying advantage distil-
lation, Protocol I, has the same effect as if Alice and Bob
would apply a quantum operation that brings two copies
of a Bell-diagonal state with coefficients {λij} into one
copy of a Bell-diagonal state with coefficients
{
λ˜ij
}
and
then perform the measurement in this final state. This
operation succeeds with probability pADsucc. We will see,
in Section III, that the corresponding quantum opera-
tion is the application of bi-local CNOT gates (i.e. Alice
applies a CNOT to her two subsystems, and Bob does
the same to his subsystems), followed by measurements
of the target qubits and post-selection of the results.
The key rate for the BB84 protocol is obtained by tak-
ing the minimum of eq. (9) over all possible values of
QY .
Note that, for protocols with advantage distillation,
the key rate, eq. (9), is not symmetric over permuta-
tion of the QBERs. Therefore, choosing a different basis
(among the set of available bases) for key generation may
lead to different key rates. We now state a curious ob-
servation about QKD protocols in which advantage dis-
tillation, given by Protocol I, is performed.
Observation 2. In an implementation of the BB84
or the six-state protocol in which advantage distillation,
given by Protocol I, is performed, higher key rates may
be obtained if the basis with higher QBER is used for the
key generation rounds.
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Figure 3: (Color online) Key rates for the six-state pro-
tocol with advantage distillation, given by Protocol I, for
the family of states QX = QZ = 0.1. Blue (dark gray)
curve shows the key rate when the Z-basis is used for
key generation, and the yellow (light gray) curve when
the Y -basis is used for key generation.
Figure 3 illustrates Observation 2 for the family of
states QX = QZ = 0.1 considered in the previous section.
In comparison with Figure 1, we note that, for lower val-
ues of QY , higher rates are obtained when no advantage
distillation is performed. However, as QY increases, an
advantage is obtained with the use of advantage distilla-
tion and, specially, if the basis with higher QBER is used
for the key generation rounds. Note also that, similar to
Observation 1, an increase in the key rate with QY for
high values of QY is also observed for the key generated
with measurements in the Y -basis.
In order to explore Observation 2 in more detail, we
have performed an extensive numerical check over the
range of possible values of QBERs (QX , QY , QZ). For
the BB84 protocol, Figure 4 illustrates that, for almost
all the values of QX and QZ that lead to positive key,
the highest asymptotic key rate is obtained when the
key generation basis is the one with higher QBER. This
behavior inverts only for a small range of parameters,
6next to the limiting region where positive key can no
longer be obtained. It is interesting to note that the
success probability of the advantage distillation protocol,
given in eq. (10), is a monotonically decreasing function
of the QBER of the key generation basis. However, even
with the contribution of this factor to the key rate, see
eq. (9), Figure 4 shows that it is typically advantageous
to use the basis with higher QBER for the key generation
rounds.
Higher rates for key generation in Z-basis
Higher rates for key generation in X-basis
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Figure 4: (Color online) Comparison of the key rates for
the BB84 protocol with advantage distillation given by
Protocol I when the X and the Z basis are used for the
key generation. The blue (dark gray) dots represent the
parameters for which higher key rates are achieved when
Z is the key generation basis. The yellow (light gray)
dots represent the case when higher rates are achieved if
X is used for key generation. One can observe that, for
almost all the range of parameters, higher rates are ob-
tained when the basis with higher QBER is used for key
generation. This behavior only inverts for a small range
of parameters, near the limiting region where positive key
can no longer be extracted.
For the six-state protocol, we numerically compared,
for the range of allowed parameters, the rates achieved
when each of the three bases is used for key generation.
Similarly to the BB84 case, we observed that higher key
rates are obtained for key generation in the basis with
higher QBER except for a small range of parameters. We
found that it is not advantageous to use the basis with
higher QBER for key generation only for some range of
QBERs (QX , QY , QZ) next to the region where no key
can be obtained. As an example, for a state with QBERs
(QX = 0.39, QY = 0.39, QZ = 0.01), one can obtain a
secret key only if the Z-basis is used for key generation
in the six-state protocol with advantage distillation given
by Protocol I.
It is interesting to remark that the advantage of using
the basis with higher QBER for protocols with advantage
distillation can also occur in practical implementations
where information reconciliation is performed using an
one-way protocol [23–25] with non-optimal asymptotic
leakage f · h(QM ), for f ≤ 1.2. Indeed, the advantage
obtained by the use of a basis with higher QBER can
be sufficiently large to compensate for the penalty of us-
ing an efficient information reconciliation protocol with
higher leakage.
Protocol I can be generalized to blocks of arbitrary size
b [15]. Even though this leads to a significant decrease in
the key rate in the low noise regime, higher noise toler-
ance can be achieved [16, 17, 27]. Figure 5 illustrates the
behavior of the key rates for the BB84 with advantage
distillation using blocks of size 7. We now find that it
is advantageous to use the basis with higher QBER for
key generation in all the range of parameters that lead
to positive key rate.
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Higher rate for key generation in X-basis
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Figure 5: (Color online) Comparison of the key rates for
the BB84 protocol with an advantage distillation pro-
tocol that uses blocks of size 7. The blue (dark gray)
dots represent the parameters for which higher key rates
are achieved when the Z-basis is used for key genera-
tion. The yellow (light gray) dots represent the case when
higher key rates are achieved with measurements in the
X-basis. For this case, it is advantageous to always use
the basis with higher QBER for key generation.
In Ref. [18], Watanabe et al. introduced an advantage
distillation protocol that does not suffer from a big drop
of the key rate in the low noise regime. The protocol in-
troduced in [18] contains Protocol I as a sub-routine, and
in the high noise regime the key rate coincides with the
one obtained using Protocol I. Therefore, we expected
7that Observation 2 may also have an impact in this pro-
tocol. Indeed, in Figure 6 we illustrate that choosing
the basis with higher QBER for key generation leads to
higher rates for the family of states QX = QZ = 0.1
when the advantage distillation protocol of Ref. [18] is
performed. This effect played a role on the key rates es-
timated in Ref. [9], for near-term implementations based
on nitrogen-vacancy platforms and quantum repeaters.
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Key generation in Z basis
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Figure 6: (Color online) Key rates for the six-state pro-
tocol with the advantage distillation protocol introduced
in Ref. [18], for the family of states QX = QZ = 0.1.
Blue (dark gray) curve illustrates the key rates when the
Z-basis is used for the key generation rounds, and the
yellow (light gray) curve when the Y -basis is used for the
key generation rounds.
III. QKD AND ENTANGLEMENT
DISTILLATION PROTOCOLS
In this section we show that the DEJMPS entangle-
ment distillation protocol [1] is related to advantage dis-
tillation, Protocol I, when it is applied to a string of
bits generated by measurements in the basis with higher
QBER.
A maximally entangled state provides a perfectly se-
cure bit of key. Therefore, quantum key distribution and
entanglement distillation are closely related [3, 11]. In
fact, if the states shared by Alice and Bob have distillable
entanglement, Alice and Bob could first distill maximally
entangled states out of their noisy shared states, and then
proceed to extract a perfectly secure key by measuring
the distilled states. Interestingly, some entanglement dis-
tillation protocols can be completely mapped into a clas-
sical post-processing of the string of bits obtained after
measurements on the initial states [16]. In that case, the
entanglement distillation protocol has a corresponding
QKD protocol that can be implemented in a prepare-
and-measure set-up. In a prepare-and-measure protocol,
measurements of the quantum states are performed as
soon as the states are received by Alice and Bob. This
is of great interest for practical implementations, as no
quantum memory is required to implement these proto-
cols. In [16], Gottesman and Lo characterized the prop-
erties that an entanglement distillation protocol needs to
satisfy in order to be turned into a prepare-and-measure
QKD protocol. The main idea is that some quantum
operations (as CNOT gates) can be translated into clas-
sical operations (as XOR of the bits) on the string of bits
generated by measurements in the initial state.
One-way information reconciliation based on hashing
functions followed by privacy amplification is closely
related to one-way entanglement distillation protocols
based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes that can
correct for the corresponding amount of bit flip and phase
flip errors [11, 12]. Similarly, the advantage distillation
protocol, given by Protocol I, can be related to a two-
to-one entanglement distillation protocol that takes two
copies of a two-qubit state and maps it into one two-
qubit state, hopefully more entangled than the original
ones. Under the assumption that the eavesdropper is re-
stricted to individual attacks, it has been shown [28, 29]
that, a positive key can be extracted from any entan-
gled state if advantage distillation with blocks of arbi-
trarily large size is applied. This shows that prepare-and-
measure implementation is as powerful as entanglement
distillation if the eavesdropper is restricted to individ-
ual attacks. This result was also generalized to high-
dimensional QKD [30, 31]. However, this equivalence
does not hold true under general attacks [27].
In the following, we will focus on a two-to-one entangle-
ment distillation protocol. We will prove an interesting
relation betwen the two-to-one entanglement distillation
protocol introduced in [1], the DEJMPS protocol, and
advantage distillation with blocks of size two, given by
Protocol I.
Protocol II: DEJMPS entanglement distillation
Consider that Alice and Bob share n copies of a Bell-
diagonal state.
1: Alice and Bob apply local unitary operations to each copy
of their states in order to bring them to the form:
ρ = λ00Φ00 + λ10Φ10 + λ11Φ11 + λ01Φ01,
s.t. λ00 >
1
2
and λ00 > λ10 ≥ λ11 ≥ λ01.
(12)
2: for every 2 systems do
3: Apply bi-local CNOT gates between the two copies.
4: Measure the target qubits and communicate the re-
sults.
5: If the measured flags are 00 or 11 keep the first system.
Else discard both pairs.
6: end for
Protocol II includes a rotation of the initial states, step
1, before the application of the CNOT gates. Any entan-
gled two-qubit Bell-diagonal state can be brought to the
form (12) by local unitaries (e.g., applying a Hadamard
to each qubit leads to a permutation of the Bell states Φ01
and Φ10). The originally proposed DEJMPS protocol [1]
8includes specific rotations that are independent of the in-
put state. In [32], it was proven that bringing the state
to the form (12), before applying the CNOT gates, max-
imizes the fidelity of the output state. Here we include
in the DEJMPS protocol, as a first step, the rotations
that optimize the output fidelity. Moreover, note that
the DEJMPS protocol can also be applied to non-Bell-
diagonal states, as any two-qubit entangled state that has
singlet fidelity higher than 12 can be brought to the form
(12) by local operations and classical communication [26,
Appendix A].
The following theorem states that the DEJMPS proto-
col is actually related to the six-state protocol with ad-
vantage distillation, given by Protocol I, when the basis
with higher QBER is chosen for the key generation.
Theorem 1. The following two procedures result in the
same key rates:
(i) Alice and Bob implement the six-state protocol with
advantage distillation, given by Protocol I, using the
basis with higher QBER for key generation.
(ii) Alice and Bob apply the DEJMPS protocol to every
two copies of their states, and subsequently imple-
ment the six-state protocol, without advantage dis-
tillation, by measuring the distilled states.
Proof. In order to prove the equivalence of procedures (i)
and (ii), we show that generating a string of bits by per-
forming measurements in the basis with higher QBER
followed by advantage distillation is equivalent to per-
forming the DEJMPS entanglement distillation protocol
and measuring the resulting state in the Z-basis.
We first note that steps 2-6 of Protocol II, followed by
the measurement of the remaining qubits, can be, equiv-
alently, implemented in a prepare-and-measure scenario.
This is due to the following observations: (a) the CNOT
gate commutes with measurements in the Z-basis; (b) the
final measurements performed on the remaining control
qubits, also commute with the post-selection operation
applied in step 5. This is due to the fact that in step 5,
a pair of qubits is discarded according to the outputs of
the target qubits only, therefore this operation acts as the
identity on the control qubits of the remaining systems.
Observations (a) and (b) imply that in an implementa-
tion of steps 2-6 of Protocol II followed by measurement
of the remaining qubits, one can first measure all the sub-
systems and then proceed to apply the CNOT gate, step
3, and post-selection of results, step 5. In this equiva-
lent description, in which all the systems are measured
first, the CNOT gate and the post-selection act on classi-
cal strings. Their action, then, corresponds to Alice and
Bob locally computing the XOR of their respective two
bits and comparing if they have the same parity. And
this is exactly the action of the advantage distillation de-
scribed in Protocol I (note that, in Protocol I, acc = 1 iff
aj1 ⊕ aj2 = bj1 ⊕ bj2).
Protocol II includes a local rotation of the quantum
states in step 1. Instead of rotating the state, we could
equivalently rotate the operations. From the previous
paragraphs we have seen that procedure (ii) of the The-
orem can be implemented by performing measurements
in the Z-basis on all the subsystems before applying the
CNOT gates and post-selection of the results. The first
step of measurements is described as
(∑
i
|i〉〈i|A ⊗
∑
i
|i〉〈i|B
)
· ρAB ·
(∑
i
|i〉〈i|A ⊗
∑
i
|i〉〈i|B
)
(13)
If the initial states are rotated before the measurements, ρAB 7→ UA ⊗ UB · ρAB · U†A ⊗ U†B , then we have
(∑
i
|i〉〈i|A ⊗
∑
i
|i〉〈i|B
)
· (UA ⊗ UB · ρAB · U†A ⊗ U†B) ·
(∑
i
|i〉〈i|A ⊗
∑
i
|i〉〈i|B
)
=
(∑
i
|i〉〈i|UA ⊗
∑
i
|i〉〈i|UB
)
· ρAB ·
(∑
i
U†A |i〉〈i| ⊗
∑
i
U†B |i〉〈i|
)
.
(14)
Since the rotations are local, they can be mapped into
the measurements, and the last expression of (14) de-
scribes measurements in the rotated bases
{
U†A |i〉
}
and
9{
U†B |i〉
}
on the original state ρAB . By the equivalence
established in the previous paragraph, Protocol II, fol-
lowed by measurement of the remaining qubits, corre-
sponds to applying the advantage distillation, Protocol
I, to a string of outcomes obtained from measurements
performed in the corresponding rotated basis.
Finally, let us evaluate the effect of the rotation per-
formed in step 1 of Protocol II. The QBERs of a Bell-
diagonal state are given by
QX = λ01 + λ11,
QY = λ01 + λ10,
QZ = λ10 + λ11.
(15)
Given the relations satisfied by the coefficients after the
rotation in step 1, eq. (12), we have that QZ ≥ QX and
QZ ≥ QY . Therefore, after the initial rotation, Z is the
basis with the highest QBER. In the alternative picture
in which all the measurements are performed first, and
the rotation of the state is mapped into a rotation of
the measurements, see eq. (14), we have that the rotated
bases,
{
U†A |i〉
}
and
{
U†B |i〉
}
, correspond to measure-
ments in the basis with the highest QBER.
So the DEJMPS protocol followed by a measurement in
the Z-basis, corresponds to advantage distillation, given
by Protocol I, applied to the outcomes of measurements
in the basis with highest QBER. This proves the equiv-
alence of procedures (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 establishes that the DEJMPS protocol falls
into the category of entanglement distillation protocols
that have a corresponding prepare-and-measure QKD as
characterized by Gottesman and Lo [16]. Moreover, it
shows that the particular rotation introduced in step
1 of Protocol II can be implemented in the prepare-
and-measure scenario by choosing the basis with higher
QBER for key generation.
In [32], it was shown that the DEJMPS protocol, Pro-
tocol II, is the two-to-one entanglement distillation pro-
tocol that achieves the highest fidelity, among all possi-
ble protocols that involve Pauli rotations. In [33] it was
proven that the DEJMPS is the optimal two-to-one en-
tanglement distillation protocol for rank 3 Bell-diagonal
states. I.e., the highest possible fidelity is achieved with
the highest possible probability of success, considering
all possible protocols that take two copies into one. We
now state analogous results for the key rates of the cor-
responding QKD protocol.
A Bell-diagonal state of rank up to 3 satisfies that one
of the QBERs is equal to the sum of the other two. With-
out loss of generality, we can consider QY = QX + QZ .
The corresponding Bell-diagonal state is then
ρ = (1−QX −QZ)Φ00 +QZΦ10 +QXΦ11. (16)
We numerically compared the key rates achieved by the
state given in eq. (16) for the six-state protocol with ad-
vantage distillation given by Protocol I and key genera-
tion in all of the three bases. In the region of positive
key rate, we observed that, over all the range of values of
QX and QZ , higher rate is achieved when Y is the key
generation basis.
For rank 4 states, using the basis with highest QBER
is not always advantageous. As mentioned in Section II,
a counter-example is given by the state with QBERs
(QX = 0.39, QY = 0.39, QZ = 0.01). For a Bell-diagonal
state with the specified QBERs, a positive key rate can
only be obtained by performing measurements in the Z-
basis in an implementation of the six-state protocol with
advantage distillation given by Protocol I. We remark,
however, that this does not contradict the fact that the
corresponding state after an application of the DEJMPS
procedure has higher fidelity. Indeed, as we have seen
from Observation 1, higher fidelity does not necessarily
imply higher key rates in the six-state protocol. Ana-
lyzing this example in detail, we find that the fidelity of
the initial state is 0.605 and no key can be extracted by
directly applying information reconciliation and privacy
amplification. If entanglement distillation is performed
without the previous rotations, i.e. by applying only
steps 4-6 of Protocol II, the final fidelity is 0.525 and pos-
itive key can be extracted from the corresponding final
state using a six-state protocol with an optimal one-way
hashing information reconciliation. Applying the DE-
JMPS protocol, in which the initial rotations are per-
formed, we obtain a state with higher fidelity, equal to
0.698, yet this state does not lead to positive key rate in
the six-state protocol.
IV. IMPLICATIONS TO EXPERIMENTAL
IMPLEMENTATIONS
We now discuss the implications of our results to fibre-
based implementations of quantum key distribution over
long distances.
The most common way of transmitting qubits over
long distances is by using photons sent through optical
fibres. One of the challenges of a fibre-based implemen-
tation is that the transmissivity of the channel decays
exponentially with the distance. It has been shown that
this also leads to an exponential decay of the achiev-
able secret-key rate over such channel [34, 35], thus mak-
ing practical QKD over direct fibre connections impos-
sible for larger distances. Significant amount of both
theoretical and experimental efforts are being invested
into overcoming this problem using the so-called quan-
tum repeaters [36], which have the capability of beating
the exponential scaling of secret-key rate with distance.
One of the fundamental building blocks of such quan-
tum repeater schemes is a memory node that can store
quantum information over time. By dividing the chan-
nel into elementary links, entanglement generation can
be attempted independently over those segments, thanks
to the quantum memories at the intermediate repeater
stations. Unfortunately, quantum states stored in such
memories decohere with time.
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Decoherence is often a complex process that could be
modeled by a composition of different noise channels de-
pending on the physical implementation of the quantum
memory. However, often the dominant type of noise cor-
responds to the dephasing channel. This has been ob-
served for many physical platforms which are promis-
ing candidates for long-lived quantum memories, such as
nitrogen-vacancy centres [37–39], trapped ions [40] and
neutral atoms [41]. Therefore, the dephasing channel is
frequently used to model memory decoherence in quan-
tum repeater literature, thus leading to expected non-
uniform QBER over the three bases [9, 42–45]. Hence,
the results of this paper will be highly relevant for choos-
ing the key generation basis for entanglement based QKD
schemes implemented across a future quantum repeater
network. In fact, some of the authors of this manuscript
have already applied the results of this work into their
model of near-term proof-of-principle quantum repeaters
based on nitrogen-vacancy centres [9].
Regarding prepare-and-measure QKD schemes, the
method of decoy states was introduced to overcome vul-
nerabilities due to imperfections in the source [46, 47]. In
a decoy state protocol, the asymptotic key rates, (3) and
(4), are modified to account for the information leakage
from the rounds in which multiple photons are generated.
The modified key rates have a much more intricate de-
pendence on the QBERs and, therefore, a detailed anal-
ysis is required to determine the effects of asymmetric
noise in decoy state implementations. We leave it as an
interesting open question for future investigation.
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